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TRADE OR BUSINESS STATUS FOR THE FULL-
TIME, ACTIVE INVESTOR: A CALL FOR A
QUALITATIVE STANDARD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most individuals maintain at least minimal holdings in the
stock market or other securities markets. The majority of these in-
vestments are maintained to supplement the individual's personal in-
come. Attention to these activities is normally secondary to the indi-
vidual's full-time occupation. Undoubtedly, this "personal" investor
is not conducting the "business" of investing and is thus not eligible
to deduct resulting losses and expenses for federal income tax
purposes.'
However, what of the treatment afforded the individual who
has no other occupation, but who spends his entire business day
managing his own portfolio, collecting extensive information on se-
curities, making decisions on the relative benefits of particular secur-
ities, and actually purchasing and selling securities, whether through
a broker or not? Should this taxpayer be given tax treatment identi-
cal to others who pursue their own occupations? Specifically, should
the full-time, active securities investor be regarded as carrying on the
"trade or business" of securities investing? This comment argues
that he should and that such an investor should therefore be eligible
to benefit from the tax status accompanying a trade or business.
Several benefits exist for the taxpayer who is able to obtain
trade or business status. In addition to receiving deductions for gen-
eral business expenses, the taxpayer engaged in a trade or business
receives ordinary loss, rather than capital loss treatment.2 Further,
the taxpayer can establish IRA and Keough plans,' carryover and
© 1989 by James H. Blundell, Jr.
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1. Deductions for business expenses are provided by section 162 of the Internal Revenue
Code. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1987). See infra note 12. In addition to the deduction for business
expenses, there are other benefits to the business taxpayer. See infra text accompanying notes
2-6 for other benefits to the business taxpayer. See infra text accompanying notes 7-8 for a
discussion of a disadvantage resulting from trade or business status.
2. 26 U.S.C. § 1221(2) (1987).
3. Id. § 408.
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carryback net operating losses,4 and avoid limitations on investment
interest.' Generally, the benefit of trade or business status lies in the
taxpayer's ability to deduct expenses "above the line," while the tax-
payer who makes such deductions merely for investment or other
personal reasons must take those deductions "below the line."6
Trade or business status is a double edged sword, though. De-
spite the above mentioned benefits to the taxpayer, certain disadvan-
tages accompany the imposition of trade or business status. The self-
employment tax is just such a disadvantage.' Taxpayers who have
made money on their enterprise often construe their activity as some-
thing other than a trade or business in order to avoid imposition of
the self-employment tax. Also, taxpayers might avoid classification as
a trade or business in order to obtain capital gain treatment.8 There-
fore, perhaps the best solution to the problem presented here is one
favoring neither the taxpayer nor the government.' Whatever the so-
4. Id. § 172(b).
5. Id. § 163(d).
6. The theoretical "line" generally lies at adjusted gross income (AGI). AGI is the sec-
ond level of income in the tax structure. The first level is gross income and is defined as "all
income from whatever source." 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (1987). Certain deductions are subtracted
from gross income to arrive at the second level, AGI. Id. § 62. These deductions are known as
"above the line" deductions. The third level of income is taxable income. Taxable income is
that income left after subtracting either the standard deduction or itemized deductions from
AGI. Id. § 63.
The advantage of taking a deduction "above the line" is that some "below the line" de-
ductions are limited to an amount in excess of seven percent of AGI. See id. § 213. Thus, the
more "above the line" deductions allowed, the lower the total amount of AGI. The lower the
AGI, the more likely "below the line" deductions will exceed seven percent of AGI.
7. 26 U.S.C. § 1401 (1987). Section 1401 imposes a nondeductible tax on the net earn-
ings from self-employment. Section 1402(a) defines net earnings from self-employment as gross
income derived from the trade or business less deductions incurred in that trade or business.
Section 1402(c) states that trade or business for the purposes of the self-employment tax will
have the same meaning as used for section 162 deductions.
8. Prior to 1986, capital gains received preferential treatment. However, Congress ended
preferential tax treatment for capital gains in the 1986 Tax Reform Act by removing the sixty
percent deduction for such gains and imposing the same twenty-eight percent tax rate on both
ordinary income and capital gains. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301, 100
Stat. 2216. Despite the current neutral treatment of capital gains, Congress intends that even if
the top individual rate should increase in future sessions, the maximum tax rate on capital
gains shall not exceed the top individual rate provided in the 1986 Tax Reform Act. S. REP.
No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1986). Therefore, the importance of capital gains treat-
ment may be significant in the future.
9. Olson, Toward a Neutral Definition of "Trade or Business" in the Internal Reve-
nue Code, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1199, 1235 (1986) (urging "a neutral definition, giving neither
taxpayers nor the government any special advantage").
Professor Olson also recognizes the danger that a neutral definition might be applied
mechanically. However, he cautions that the presence of the danger is no reason to continue
without any standard. Id. at 1236.
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lution, a standard must be formulated and applied in order to pro-
vide predictability and certainty for taxpayers, tax practitioners and
the courts alike.
Section II of this comment reviews the legal background under-
lying trade or business treatment of the investor and securities
trader. Part A of section II sets forth the statutory basis in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code for determining the investor's tax treatment. Part
B provides the tests traditionally employed by the courts in deter-
mining trade or business status. An analysis of the conflicting argu-
ments in the area follows in section III. Section IV proposes that, in
basing trade or business status on an examination of the facts and
circumstances in each case, the courts should begin to emphasize the
qualitative characteristics, in addition to the quantitative characteris-
tics of doing business.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Authority
The treatment of personal activities is specifically distinguished
from the treatment of trade or business activities in the Internal Rev-
enue Code (IRC). IRC section 262 provides that "no deduction shall
be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."'" This restric-
tion is justifiable in light of the general policy permitting an allow-
ance for deductions. The federal income tax is theoretically a tax on
nothing more than net income. The government allows taxpayers to
deduct all expenses incurred in earning that income since such ex-
penses are presumed to have generated the income." Since personal
expenses generally do not contribute to the creation of income; they
are not deductible.
On the other hand, individuals performing a "trade or busi-
ness" are allowed a deduction from their taxable income in the
amount of all "ordinary and necessary expenses" paid or incurred in
10. 26 U.S.C. § 262 (1987). Although the exclusion of personal deductions in section
262 appears to be all-encompassing, some personal expenses may be deducted by the taxpayer.
Included among those expenses specifically deductible are interest payments on indebtedness
under section 163, state taxes under section 164, qualified medical expenses under section 213,
charitable contributions under section 170, and casualty and theft losses under section
165(c)(3).
11. The general theory underlying the business deduction was enunciated by Justice
Roberts in a dissenting opinion. He stated that "Ithe dominant purpose evidenced by the
income tax statutes is to tax net income. The policy is to credit against gross income the
expenses of the business which begets earnings. The taxpayer is entitled to deduct that which
he reasonably and in good faith expended in the effort to realize a profit." Deputy v. DuPont,
308 U.S. 488, 500 (1940).
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carrying on such a trade or business. This deduction is allowed pur-
suant to section 162 of the IRC.' This section is said to be the busi-
ness deduction "workhorse.""3 Although the phrase is known mostly
for its appearance in section 162, "trade or business" appears fre-
quently in other parts of the IRC. Despite the phrase's extensive use
in at least sixty IRC sections and in 170 different places within the
code,1 the IRC fails to define the phrase expressly. 5 Under normal
circumstances, when Congress leaves statutory language relatively
undefined, the evolution of such a definition is left to the judiciary.
However, in the case of trade or business treatment, the courts have
failed to enunciate a clear standard of activity that is both adequately
restrictive and sufficiently broad to circumscribe that behavior specif-
12. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1987). Text appears as follows:
(a) In general-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business, including-
(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal
services actually rendered;
(2) traveling expenses . . . while away from home in the pursuit of a trade
or business; and
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property
Id.
13. J. FREELAND, S. LIND, AND R. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 337 (6th ed. 1987) [hereinafter J. FREELAND].
14. Boiling & Carper, The Evolving Definition of "Trade or Business": Ditunno and
Beyond, TAXES, Jan. 1985, 73, 73 (citing IRC §§ 62(1), 162(a), 165(c), 166(d), 167(a)(1),
168(c), 172(d), 174, 217(0, 280A(c)(1), 1221, 1231, and 1402(a)).
15. Boiling & Carper, supra note 14, at 73 ("Despite the prolific use of the term and its
obvious importance, neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the regulations have promulgated
a specific definition of what is meant by the phrase 'trade or business.' "); Orbach & White,
How To Establish Existence of a Trade or Business in Light of Recent Conflicting Decisions,
13 TAX'N FOR LAW. 38, 38 (1984) ("that phrase has never specifically been defined in the
Regulations").
In an effort to assist small businesses, the IRS recently defined trade or business as:
[A]n activity carried on for livelihood or for profit. For an activity to be consid-
ered a business, a profit motive must be present and some type of economic
activity must be involved. It is distinguished from an activity engaged in purely
for personal satisfaction.
A business usually has regular transactions that produce income. To carry
out these transactions, it has to incur a number of expenses ....
You should be able to show annually by facts and circumstances that you
were in business during that year.
IRS PUB. No. 334, TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS 2 (1981). With the exception of the
concept of livelihood, this definition provides nothing more than the tests currently used by the
courts.
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ically intended to receive trade or business recognition. 6 The courts
have only highlighted a few factors that weigh highly in their consid-
eration of the facts of a particular case.17
Although personal activities have been specifically treated in
section 262 and trade or business activities have been specifically
treated in section 162 (as well as elsewhere), a gray area exists be-
tween the two sections that has received comparatively less attention.
Activities in this gray area, including investment activities, involve
some economic activity, yet also resemble personal activities. In 1941,
the United States Supreme Court in Higgins v. Commissioner"8 de-
nied trade or business status for the personal investment manager. 9
A year later, Congress sought to fill the void created by Higgins by
enacting a new deduction. Apparently, Congress reacted to the Hig-
gins decision and sought to provide some deductibility for the ex-
penses incurred by the taxpayer in maintaining his or her personal
investment portfolio. Section 212 of the IRC allows a deduction for
expenses incurred "for the production or collection of income," or
"for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held
for the production of income."20 Although the section 212 deduction
provides some amelioration for the investor, the benefits of trade or
business classification as. provided by section 162 are far more
favorable.
Perhaps the most significant difference between sections 212
and 162 is the two percent floor imposed by section 67 on certain
16. Curtis, Commissioner v. Groetzinger-Supreme Court Holds That the "Goods or
Services" Test is Not a Prerequisite to "Trade or Business" Status, 22 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 221, 223 (1987) (trade or business "is not defined in the Code, the Treasury Regula-
tions, or the legislative history. What constitutes a trade or business has been left to the deter-
mination of the judiciary and has long been a disputed issue" (citing Noto v. United States,
598 F. Supp. 440, 442 (D.N.J. 1984), af'd, 770 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1985))); Boiling &
Carper, supra note 14, at 73 (The meaning of trade or business "has been developed by the
judiciary on a case-by-case basis. This approach . . . has led to a variety of interpretations and
an inconsistent application of the phrase."); Orbach & White, supra note 15, at 39 ("Unfortu-
nately, [the cases] suggest no other guidelines or factors with respect to the trade or business
determination. Consequently, it has been left to the lower courts ... to develop trade or
business attributes.").
One court defined trade or business to include "all means of gaining a livelihood by work,
even those which would scarcely be so characterized in common speech." Trent v. Commis-
sioner, 291 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1961). However, this definition has not been adopted else-
where. Boyle, What is a Trade or Business?, 39 TAx LAw. 737, 738 n.12 (1986).
17. See infra text in section IIBI. and notes 23-38.
18. 312 U.S. 212 (1941). See infra text accompanying notes 47-59.
19. The term "investment manager" is used to describe one who performs passive in-
vestment (e.g., Mr. Higgins) rather than active investment. See infra notes 92-93, 113-14,
118-20.
20. 26 U.S.C. § 212 (1987).
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deductions, including those of section 212.1 This limitation allows
certain deductions only to the extent that the aggregate of such de-
ductions exceeds two percent of adjusted gross income. Therefore, if
any particular tax year yields a large amount of income for the in-
vestor, but his or her expenses related to such investment fall below
two percent of adjusted gross income, these deductions will be
denied.22
As this examination of the applicable IRC sections illustrates,
the investor is encouraged to classify his or her activity as that of a
trade or business. The securities investor who has incurred great ex-
pense and loss, in particular, would benefit by trade or business sta-
tus. Without a clearer definition of the phrase, however, "trade or
business" alone does little to distinguish section 162. The taxpayer
needs guidance; how should he conduct himself in order to receive
trade or business status? The courts have attempted to interpret the
phrase, yet their legacy has not accomplished the objective.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Trade or Business Under I.R.C.
Section 162
1. Traditional Trade or Business Tests
The Internal Revenue Code only provides the general language
needed to determine the activities that will receive trade or business
classification. From there, the federal courts have generated guide-
lines upon which taxpayers are expected to rely. Generally, the first
rule is that every trade or business determination will be made upon
an examination of all the "facts and circumstances."23 The facts and
circumstances test was established in the Higgins case and remains
the starting point from which all subsequent courts have determined
trade or business status. Upon this underlying layer of facts and cir-
cumstances, the courts have highlighted several factors they consider
significant. Otherwise, without specifying the important factors, a
facts and circumstances test is nothing more than an empty rule.24
Therefore, over the years the courts have generated three specific
21. Id. § 67.
22. Although these results may appear equitable, when one considers that the deduction
would have been allowed had income not been so great, the goal of encouraging the production
of income is lost.
23. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941). See also infra notes 47-59 and
accompanying text.
24. Olson, supra note 9, at 1234 (stating that an examination of "the facts of each case
is a necessary part of adjudicating tax controversies, but some guidance is needed in deciding
which facts are important") (citing United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985)).
[Vol. 29
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tests to be used in determining trade or business status: (1) the profit
motive test, (2) the actively engaged test, and (3) the goods or ser-
vices test.25 These tests have been applied generally to all trade or
business determinations.
a. Profit Motive
Cases in the investor/trader area require that the taxpayer con-
duct his business with the intention of creating a profit.26 In fact,
business conduct, by definition, implies that the business person is
seeking a profit.2 ' Tax deductibility is denied unless the profit motive
can be established. This test does not require that the business per-
25. See infra text accompanying notes 26-38. See Boiling & Carper, supra note 14, at
76, 77 (outlining three traditional tests); Slattery & Nordhauser, Trade or Business Status:
Recent Judicial Interpretations, 17 TAx ADVISER 112, 113 (1986) (also outlining the three
tests); see also Boyle, supra note 16, at 739, 743 (recognizing the three traditional tests and
adding a fourth: the activity must have actually commenced).
26. Bessenyey v. Commissioner, 379 F.2d 252, 256 (2d Cir.) ("deductibility of 'busi-
ness-like' expenses or losses is denied unless the taxpayer can show an intention to seek
profit"), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967); Lamont v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 377, 380 (2d
Cir. 1964) ("It is well established that the existence of a genuine profit motive is the most
important criterion for the finding that a given course of activity constitutes a trade or busi-
ness."); Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 1963) ("it is clear that Congress
intended that the profit or income motive must first be present in and dominate any taxpayer's
'trade or business' before deductions may be taken"); Doggett v. Burnet, 65 F.2d 191, 194
(D.C. Cir. 1933) ("The proper test is ... whether [the activity] is entered into and carried on
in good faith and for the purpose of making a profit . . . and that it is not conducted merely
for pleasure, exhibition, or social diversion."); Thacher v. Lowe, 288 F. 994, 995 (S.D.N.Y.
1922) ("if a man does not expect to make any gain or profit out of the management of the
farm, it cannot be said to be a business for profit").
27. Stanton v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1968). In addition to the implica-
tion that business conduct naturally seeks profit, section 183 specifically denies, with certain
exceptions, a deduction for activities "not engaged in for profit." 26 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1987).
Subsection (c) of section 183 defines activities "not engaged in for profit" as activities other
than those "with respect to which deductions are allowable ... under section 162 or ...
section 212." Id. § 183(c). Treasury Regulations §§ 1.183-2(b)(1) to (9) (1972) provide the
following relevant factors that should be taken into account in determining whether an activity
is engaged in for profit:
(1) Manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity.
(2) The expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors.
(3) The time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the
activity.
(4) The expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value.
(5) The success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar
activities.
(6) The taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity.
(7) The amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned.
(8) The financial status of the taxpayer.
(9) Elements of personal pleasure or recreation.
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son actually make a profit. The individual must merely operate the
enterprise with a good faith intention of creating a profit. 8
b. Actively Engaged
The second trade or business test employed by the courts re-
quires that the taxpayer engage in the alleged business activities in
an active manner. Transactions must generally be carried out with
regularity, frequency, and a measure of continuity.29 Similarly, the
taxpayer's activity must have actually commenced. ° While a single
transaction normally does not constitute a trade or business, the tax-
payer who initiates the sole transaction is considered actively en-
gaged in the enterprise if it is carried out with the expectation that
additional transactions will be made in the same field.31 Further-
more, courts have held that a taxpayer is conducting a business if he
can show "that he devotes a substantial portion of his time to the
activities," or "that there has been extensive or repeated activity over
a substantial period of time. '"32
c. Goods or Services
In an attempt to provide additional clarification in the trade or
business area, Justice Frankfurter proposed the goods or services
test. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in the 1940 case of Deputy v.
DuPont8 stated that a person was not engaged in a trade or business
28. Malmstedt v. Commissioner, 578 F.2d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 1978) ("Success is not the
test of deductibility as a business expense. The test is whether the business was undertaken 'in
good faith for the purpose of making a profit.' ").
29. Reese v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 1980) ("the lack of continuity
and frequency of activity in a particular field of endeavor is a strong indicia that a taxpayer is
not engaged in a trade or business in that field"); Stanton, 399 F.2d at 329 ("A taxpayer can
show that his activities are a 'business' by demonstrating that he devotes a substantial portion
of his time to the activities . . . or that there has been extensive or repeated activity over a
substantial period of time."); Thomas v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 1958)
("Frequency and continuity of sales transactions have been regarded as important tests.");
Dunlap v. Oldham Lumber Co., 178 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 1950) ("[A] most important
factor is continuity of sales and sales related activity over a period of time. . . . Frequency of
sales, as opposed to isolated transactions has been emphasized."); Fahs v. Crawford 161 F.2d
315, 317 (5th Cir. 1947) ("Carrying on a business, however, implies an occupational under-
taking to which one habitually devotes time, attention, or effort with substantial regularity.").
30. One commentator distinguishes the "activity commenced" requirement as an inde-
pendent test. Boyle, supra note 16, at 748. For the purposes of this comment, the "activity
commenced" requirement is incorporated into the actively engaged test.
31. Reese, 615 F.2d at 230, 231.
32. Stanton, 399 F.2d at 329.
33. 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
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unless he held himself out to others as offering goods or services.84
Following its application in DuPont, the goods or services test was
used by several circuit courts and by the Tax Court as a mandatory
requirement in the determination of trade or business status."'
In 1987, however, the Tax Court reversed its previous rulings
to hold that the failure to satisfy the goods or services test alone is
not enough to lose the trade or business battle.86 The test was never
adopted by a majority of the United States Supreme Court, neither
implicitly nor expressly, and has been completely ignored in several
cases in which its application may have been appropriate.87 Thus,
when the Supreme Court recently reviewed the continuing viability
of the test, it was predictably rejected as an absolute requirement."
Presumably, then, only the profit motive and actively engaged tests
remain as absolute requirements.
2. The Investor/Trader Distinction
a. Trade or Business Status Denied to the Investor
Beginning in the 1930's, the distinction between the investor
and the trader began to take shape. Early on, the courts used the
distinction to deny trade or business status to what they referred to
as the investor. As will be seen later, other courts recognized a dis-
tinction, but drew the line differently.
Snyder v. Commissioner89 is often cited as the case that initially
introduced the investor/trader distinction as a legitimate demarca-
34. Id. at 499.
35. See Grosswald v. Schweiker, 653 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1981) (asserting that the goods or
services test is a settled rule within the tax law); Gentile v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1, 6 (1975)
("Upon stepping up to the betting window, petitioner was not holding himself out as offering
any goods or services to anyone."); Helvering v. Highland, 124 F.2d 556, 561 (4th Cir. 1942)
("the term has been re-defined ... and narrowed so that 'carrying on any trade or business' is
now said to mean 'holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or ser-
vices' "); Helvering v. Wilmington Trust Co., 124 F.2d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1941) (quoting
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Deputy v. DuPont and holding that an investor was not
"holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services." DuPont, 308
U.S. at 499).
36. Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 362, 366-67 (1983).
37. The goods or services test has been characterized as the "most controversial" of all
the tests. Boyle, supra note 16, at 746. The controversy allegedly stems from the fact that the
Court in Higgins did not cite the test proposed just one year before by Justice Frankfurter in
DuPont. Id. Neither was the test cited in the two companion cases to Higgins. United States v.
Pyne, 313 U.S. 127 (1941); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Helvering, 313 U.S. 121 (1941).
38. Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. 980, 987 (1987) ("while the offering of
goods and services usually would qualify the activity as a trade or business, this factor, it seems
to us, is not an absolute prerequisite"). See infra text accompanying notes 121-26.
39. 295 U.S. 134 (1935).
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tion. 40 In Snyder, the United States Supreme Court held that an in-
dividual who maintains a margin account through a broker, is not
conducting a trade or business. 41 Mr. Snyder was concededly a mar-
gin investor. Under a margin account, the taxpayer's broker
purchases stock for his customer on credit when prices are rising in
order to increase the holdings of the account and sells securities
when prices are falling in order to cover the credit advanced to the
individual. 42 By Snyder's own admission, his intention was not to
draw profits from the account, but to increase his holdings to the
extent permitted by his margin of credit.43
The Snyder Court set forth a rule that calls for the application
of trade or business status to any taxpayer who is "regularly engaged
in the business of buying and selling corporate stocks" or who de-
votes at least a substantial portion of time to speculating in securities
for the purpose of making a living."" Such a person is to be desig-
nated as a trader. This is apparently where the distinction from an
investor lies. Mr. Snyder failed to prove, or even allege, that he spent
a substantial portion of his business day attending to his stock trans-
actions. Nor, as the opinion quoted from an earlier case,45 could Mr.
Snyder be characterized as a "trader on an exchange who makes a
living in buying and selling securities.''46
The Court's language in Snyder appears to have established the
level of activity necessary for a securities trader to be considered a
trade or business. In cases subsequent to Snyder, layers of additional
requirements were slowly added as the courts moved the line be-
tween the trader and the investor further from the investor. An in-
creasingly smaller set of activities would qualify the investor as con-
40. See Boyle, supra note 16, at 755 (stating that the investor/trader distinction was
recognized by the Supreme Court as early as 1935 in Snyder). The trend toward an investor/
trader distinction actually began as early as the 1920's. See Schermerhorn v. Commissioner, 26
B.T.A. 1031 (1932); Hodgson v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 256 (1931); Elliott v. Commis-
sioner, 15 B.T.A. 494 (1929); Schwinn v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 1304 (1928); I.T. 1818, 11-
2 C.B. 39 (1923).
41. 295 U.S. at 139.
42. A margin account is defined as the
[s]ecurities industry's method of extending credit to a customer. Under such a
practice customer purchases specified amount of stock from securities firm by
advancing only portion of purchase price, with brokerage firm extending credit
or making loan for balance due, and firm maintains such stock as collateral for
loan and charges interest on balance of purchase price.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 871 (5th ed. 1979).
43. Snyder, 295 U.S. at 139.
44. Id.
45. Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929).
46. Snyder, 295 U.S. at 139.
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ducting a trade or business.
Perhaps the most influential and frequently quoted case dealing
with the issues of an investor's tax treatment is Higgins v. Commis-
sioner.4 7 In Higgins, the petitioner resided in Paris and maintained
offices both there and in New York.48 The employees in the New
York office conducted petitioner's financial affairs in response to his
instructions sent by cable, telephone, and mail.4 The New York of-
fice "kept records, received securities, interest and dividend checks,
made deposits, forwarded weekly and annual reports, and undertook
the general care of the investments as instructed by the owner."'
From a distance, the petitioner "kept a watchful eye over his
securities."5 1
Higgins established the long tradition of determining a tax-
payer's trade or business status on a case-by-case basis. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion in which the "facts and circumstances" test was
established: "To determine whether the activities of a taxpayer are
'carrying on a business' requires an examination of the facts in each
case."52 Although subject to factual review by the Tax Court58 and
other courts, the Internal Revenue Service is charged with the duty
of determining what facts will constitute carrying on a trade or
business.54
The Higgins Court failed to delineate a clear standard of activ-
ity required for the investor to be considered a trade or business.
Instead of stating what types of activities and the levels of each nec-
essary to qualify as a trade or business, the opinion merely stated
that this taxpayer's activities were insufficient to constitute a trade or
business.5" In effect, the Higgins Court did nothing more to help
define trade or business than to create a passive standard for com-
parison.56 Because the petitioner had "merely kept records and col-
47. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).




52. Id. at 217.
53. Originally created as the Board of Tax Appeals, in 1942 the court was renamed the
Tax Court. J. FREELAND, supra note 13, at 29.
54. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 217-18.
55. Id. at 218. "The Commissioner and the Board appraised the evidence here as insuf-
ficient to establish petitioner's activities as those of carrying on a business." Id.
56. For purposes of this comment, a court establishes a passive standard when it reviews
the facts in the instant case and concludes merely that those facts do not satisfy the particular
rule of law.
A famous example of a passive standard is presented in Justice Stewart's concurring opin-
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lected interest and dividends from his securities," the Court was una-
ble to reverse the lower court's decision denying the business
deduction.5"
The Higgins Court also ruled that the determination of the tax-
payer's trade or business status be made without regard to the size of
the taxpayer's portfolio or the continuity and extent of the manage-
rial operations." No matter how much work and effort is expended
in the collection of interest and dividends, nor how high the value of
the taxpayer's estate, the Court was unwilling to recognize the tax-
payer's passive activities as a trade or business. "9
The Tax Court began expanding the distinction between the
trader and the investor in Chang Hsiao Liang v. Commissioner.60
The petitioner in that case was a Chinese national who had ar-
ranged for an American banker to manage and protect his invest-
ments during hostilities in China.61 The banker, Cochran, estab-
lished an account for Liang at Guaranty Trust Company in New
York.6" Between the years 1938 and 1946, Guaranty Trust bought
and sold securities for the petitioner only upon Cochran's instruc-
tions.6" Cochran made all decisions regarding the purchase and sale
of securities in the account and rarely received communication from
Liang.6" Although this was Cochran's sole occupation during these
years, Liang was not involved at all in the management of his
investments.65
ion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Before concluding that a film presented by a
theater owner was not obscene, Justice Stewart stated that while he could not define obscenity
in concrete terms, he would "know it when [he saw] it." Id. at 197.
57. Id. at 218.
58. "No matter how large the estate or how continuous or extended the work required
may be, such facts are not sufficient as a matter of law to permit the courts to reverse the
decision of the Board." Id.
59. Id. Collection of income and maintenance of records are considered passive activities.
It is not contended that the "passive" investor should be considered carrying on a trade or
business. See infra notes 92-93, 113-14, 118-20 and accompanying text.
60. 23 T.C. 1040 (1955).
61. Id. at 1041. Other than his position as a Manchurian military governor, the peti-
tioner maintained no other occupation. In 1928, the petitioner became acquainted with the
banker, Cochran, who was manager of the Mukden, Manchuria branch of the National City
Bank of New York. Petitioner established a securities account with the branch. When Cochran
left Manchuria in 1932, he and the petitioner agreed that Cochran would continue to manage
petitioner's investments in exchange for a monthly salary and a one percent commission. Id.
62. Id. at 1041-42.
63. Id. at 1042.
64. Id. "Cochran exercised sole discretion as to the management of the account, includ-
ing decisions as to the items and times of purchase and sale and the exercising of proxies." Id.
65. Id. "Cochran performed no similar services for any other person in 1946, and had
no other occupation aside from supervising petitioner's account. He bought and sold securities
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A new twist on the old investor/trader distinction found its way
into the Tax Court's opinion in Liang. In determining that Liang's
activities were not those of a trade or business, the court relied pri-
marily on the frequency of the taxpayer's trading and the relative
length of time the stock was held. Petitioner's account was invested
primarily in securities. In the taxable year 1946, the average holding
period of stocks sold was 5.8 years. 6 The majority of gains and
losses over the period prior to 1946 were from long-term holdings
and the ratio of purchases and sales, in dollars, to the value of the
entire portfolio was small.6 7 These facts were important to the court
when it stated its newly found basis for the investor/trader
distinction:
The distinction between an investment account and a trading
account is that in the former, securities are purchased to be held
for capital appreciation and income, usually without regard to
short-term developments that would influence the price of the
securities on the daily market. In a trading account, securities
are bought and sold with reasonable frequency in an endeavor
to catch the swings in the daily market movements and profit
thereby on a short-term basis.68
Curiously, this language appears in the case without citation to prior
authority. This was the first reference by a court to a test based on
short-term holdings. The Tax Court, it would seem, went beyond
the language in Higgins and Snyder to add a previously undeclared
requirement to the investor's list of factors necessary for trade or
business recognition. This extension was made without regard to the
original objectives of the business deduction.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the petitioner's objective
through no agency other than [petitioner's] account in 1946." Id.
66. Id. at 1044.
67. Id. at 1043. The opinion only gives sales figures for the year 1946. In 1946, sales
totalled $442,886.63, with the net gain from these sales totalling $141,598.84. More than
$132,000 of this gain was derived from the sale of securities held longer than two years. Of
this $132,000, more than $93,000 was derived from securities held longer than three years and
of this $93,000, more than $60,000 was derived from securities held longer than five years.
In 1946, the ratio of sales proceeds to the total value of the portfolio was $442,886.63 to
$2.3 million or approximately I to 5.
The court also emphasized the fact that Cochran did not deal in commodities, purchase
stock on margin, borrow for the purchase of stock, make any hedges or short sales, and never
purchased any "puts" or "calls." Id. During the years 1940 and 1946, the account experienced
greater activity and closer supervision. Id. at 1043, 1044. However, the court dismissed such
activity, attributing it to world conditions such as the fall of France and the imminent entry of
the United States into World War II. Id.
68. Id. at 1043 (emphasis added).
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was to produce income and preserve the principal of the portfolio. 69
This coupled with the absence of "frequent short-term turnover" in
the portfolio suggested that the petitioner, through his custodian ac-
count, was conducting investment activity rather than a trading
operation.7
0
b. The Courts Uphold Trade or Business Status for the
Investor
In 1943, shortly after Higgins was decided, the Second Circuit
set a precedent in favor of trade or business status for an investor.
Strangely, in Fuld v. Commissioner, 1 the court failed to mention the
rule presented in Higgins. Perhaps more unusual, the Fuld ruling
has not been followed in subsequent decisions.
Leonhard Fuld devoted his full-time to "the study of new texts,
reading services, charting prices of securities, conferring with his
broker, attending meetings of corporations in which he owned securi-
ties, and consulting with corporate executives." 2 His sister Floren-
tine, the other petitioner, conducted her affairs in a similar manner
and her transactions were almost entirely of the same stocks and in
the same amounts as her brother, Leonhard." Most of the petition-
ers' stock sales were of securities held for more than two years.74
The main source of their livelihood was the profit from these
69. Id. at 1045. The Tax Court was satisfied "that the primary, if not the sole objective,
was that of an investment account established to provide a reliable source of income." Id. They
also found that the petitioner "did no more than was required to preserve an investment ac-
count for his principal." Id.
70. Id. at 1044. "The absence of frequent short-term turnover in petitioner's portfolio
negatives the conclusion that these securities were sold as part of a trading operation rather
than as investment activity." Id.
71. 139 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1943).
72. Id. at 467. Petitioner devoted an average of eight hours per day to these activities.
Id.
73. Florentine Fuld had no trade or business other than buying and selling se-
curities. . . .It was her policy to buy and sell the same securities as Leonhard
Fuld and in the same amounts. . . .Her orders were placed with the broker
through Leonhard Fuld, who acted as agent only in the physical transmission of
such orders and the acceptance of deliveries.
Id.
74. Two hundred and forty-nine of Leonhard's sales were of securities that had been
held for more than two years. Ninety-eight had been held for two years or less. Two hundred
and twenty-nine of Florentine's sales were of securities that had been held more than two




The Second Circuit upheld the lower court's finding that the
securities purchased by these taxpayers were held in the course of a
trade or business.7 6 The court rejected the Commissioner's argument
that the goods or services test from Justice Frankfurter's dissent in
DuPont should apply here. 7 The court distinguished the facts in
DuPont stating that the taxpayer in that case made only a single
transaction with a single company.7 8 The Fulds, on the other hand,
were "actively trading in securities rather than effectuating what
amounted to a single deal."7 9 In language completely inconsistent
with Higgins, the court concluded that its holding was supported by
a "long administrative practice" of determining that "persons who
buy and sell securities on their own account are engaged in a trade
or business."8 °
The next case giving the investor hope in establishing trade or
business status was decided by the United States Court of Claims in
1979. Levin v. United States"1 presented a taxpayer who had in-
curred a business bad debt and declared this bad debt as a business
deduction under IRC section 166.82 He wished to carry back the
deduction and receive a tax refund. The court concluded that the
taxpayer was carrying on the business of trading.8"
In 1961, the year in which the debt was incurred, the petitioner
75. The main source of livelihood of both petitioners was from their securities
transactions. They maintained no business office, had no customers to whom
they might sell securities, practically never sold securities short, and never ad-
vertised or held themselves out to the public as dealers. . . . Neither of the
petitioners was a director, officer, or employee of any of the companies in which
they purchased securities in 1930 and thereafter.
Id.
76. Id. at 468.
77. Id. (citing Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940)). See also supra text ac-
companying notes 33-38.
78. Fuld v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 465, 468 (2d Cir. 1943). The taxpayer in DuPont
attempted to deduct expenses incurred in borrowing a block of stock of the DuPont Company
to distribute to executive officers. DuPont, 308 U.S. at 490-92.
79. Fuld, 139 F.2d at 468.
80. Id. at 469.
81. 597 F.2d 760 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
82. 26 U.S.C. § 166 (1987). Section 166 allows a deduction for a business debt "which
becomes worthless within the taxable year ... ." Id. § 166(a)(1). It also allows a deduction
for a partially worthless business debt approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. §
166(a)(2).
83. Petitioner's appeal was ultimately denied on grounds other than the trade or busi-
ness issue. The court held that the plaintiff could not claim the deduction and carry it back for
the refund he sought because the bad loans were not of a business nature and were not legally
worthless. Levin, 597 F.2d at 767.
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conducted 332 securities transactions.84 Since the time he was a
young man, Mr. Levin spent almost all of his working hours
purchasing and selling securities.85 Frequently, he visited and met
with the officers of companies he was considering for his invest-
ment.86 Because the petitioner was a margin trader,87 he spent a
substantial amount of time with his brokers on Wall Street, often
eating lunch with them at the Stock Exchange Club.88 He kept accu-
rate records of all his stock trades and he regularly attended stock-
holders' meetings and lectures sponsored by stock analysts on sub-
jects of interest to him."
First, the court acknowledged the lack of a precise standard,
promulgated either by the courts, the code, or the regulations, that
characterizes a taxpayer's activity as that of a trader rather than an
investor. 9" However, "it is clear," the court noted, that "such a...
'businessman' exists, given the proper facts."91 Second, the court at-
tempted to clarify the definition of the trader. Recalling the Higgins
rule that the mere collection of income and maintenance of records
was not sufficient to give the taxpayer the business deduction regard-
less of the continuity and extensiveness of the work performed,92 the
court stated what more was required to be considered a trader:
In effect, a "trader" is an active investor in that he does not
passively accumulate earnings, nor merely oversee his accounts,
but manipulates his holdings in an attempt to produce the best
possible yield. That is, the trader's profits are derived through
the very acts of trading-direct management of purchasing and
selling."
In essence, the Levin court made an additional distinction between
the active investor, who is the functional equivalent of a trader, and
a passive investor, who merely receives the benefit of the portfolio by
generally overseeing its management.9 ' Most importantly, the opin-
84. Id. at 763. The 332 transactions consisted of the transfer of 112,400 shares with a
total value of $3,452,125. Id.
85. Id. at 762.
86. Id. at 763.
87. See supra note 42 for a definition of a margin account.
88. Levin, 597 F.2d at 763.
89. Id. "He maintained ledger sheets of all his stock transactions, attended stockholders'
meetings, and generally spent his time purchasing and selling securities on his own account."
Id.
90. Id. at 765.
91. Id.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
93. Levin, 597 F.2d at 765 (emphasis added).
94. The court continues with this distinction:
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ion failed to mention whether the taxpayer held his securities on a
short-term or long-term basis prior to their sales. Apparently, this
factor did not play any importance in the court's conclusion.
Moller v. United States" gave the Federal Circuit an opportu-
nity to apply the active investor standard developed only three years
earlier in Levin.9" In fact, Moller arose on appeal from the United
States Claims Court where the Levin standard was applied and the
active investor was determined to be a trade or business.9 The Fed-
eral Circuit declined the opportunity to apply a workable standard
and instead reversed on the basis of the Liang short-term test."
During the tax years 1976 and 1977, Mr. and Mrs. Moller
managed four investment portfolios with total values approximating
$13,500,000 and $14,500,000 in the respective years." The stocks
sold in these years had been held for an average of more than three
and one-half years in 1976 and eight years in 1977.100 The Mollers
received over 98% of their gross income in both 1976 and 1977 in
the form of interest and dividend income. 1
Also during these years, the couple devoted their full-time to the
necessary investment activities.' 2 Each spent between forty and
forty-two hours per week at these activities, kept regular office
hours, and monitored the stock market and the performance of their
portfolios extensively on a daily basis.103
The petitioners supplemented their intensive research and mon-
Even absent a clear judicial demarcation between trader and investor, it is ap-
parent that plaintiff taxpayer's securities activities place him close to the trader
end of the spectrum. Aside from a small annual salary for sitting on the board
of an oil-producing company, his entire and substantial income was derived
from his trading. He devoted virtually his whole working day to his stock trans-
actions, unlike the taxpayers in Snyder and Wilson. In contrast to the distant
management of a portfolio portrayed in Higgins, judgments regarding purchases
and sales were made directly by taxpayer, based on his personal investigation of
the assets, operation and management of various corporations. In addition, the
sheer quantity of transactions he conducted also supports a reasonable conclu-
sion that this taxpayer's business was trading on his own account.
Id. at 765. See also Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941) (stating that the
taxpayer "merely kept records and collected interest and dividends from his securities").
95. 721 F.2d 810 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 81-94.
97. 553 F. Supp. 1071 (Cl. Ct. 1982), rev'd, 721 F.2d 810 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
98. Id. at 813.
99. Moller, 553 F. Supp. at 1072.
100. Id. at 1074.
101. Moller, 721 F.2d at 812.
102. Moller, 553 F. Supp. at 1073.
103. Id.
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itoring with several support activities: they maintained and updated
a watch list of all stocks currently being considered for possible
purchase; they kept extensive product research notes on each com-
pany's product and industry; they produced stock purchase projec-
tion worksheets based on their own research and daily quotations
containing projections for comparisons between stocks and projec-
tions of the stocks likely to be sold; they collected market informa-
tion, such as closing prices, type of stock, stock ratings, symbols, and
price ranges, on all securities held in the portfolios and those being
considered for possible purchase; and, they maintained records on
the current status of all stocks held, including information regarding
capital gains and dividends distributed.""
Additionally, the Mollers subscribed to three daily investment
publications, ten on a weekly basis, three on a monthly basis, and
five were received quarterly.105 Mr. Moller spent between eight and
ten hours per week studying these materials and Mrs. Moller spent
between seven and eight hours per week.' 0 The Mollers were in
telephone contact with their stock broker on an average basis of
every other day.107 Some days they placed ten or fifteen calls to the
broker; on others, one or two calls were placed.'0 8
The Mollers maintained two offices-one in Santa Barbara,
California and a second in Scottsdale, Arizona-at which they con-
ducted their investment activities.1 09 At the Scottsdale office, the
Mollers employed a part-time secretary/bookkeeper who worked ap-
proximately twenty-two hours per week assisting in the maintenance
of the portfolios." 0 The cost of employing the secretary/bookkeeper,
maintaining the two offices and subscribing to the publications to-
talled $22,659.91 in 1976 and $29,561.69 in 1977."' These ex-
penses were allowed as business deductions by the U.S. Claims
Court, but were disallowed on review by the Federal Circuit.
The Claims Court recognized the distinction between trader
and investor and conceded that the petitioners here were investors
because of their interest in long-term growth and dividend income." 2
The court indicated that the cases had also distinguished between the
104. Id. at 1073-74.
105. Id. at 1074.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1075.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1072.
110. Id. at 1075.
111. Id. at 1072.
112. Id. at 1075.
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passive investor and an investor who is recognized as carrying on a
business. " 8 It was clear that these petitioners were "anything but
'passive' investors. On the contrary, their investment activities were
regular, extensive, and continuous, and they involved the active and
constant exercise of managerial and decision-making functions."14
The Federal Circuit felt otherwise and reversed the Claims
Court decision. The Federal Circuit's opinion relied primarily on the
Liang short-term test.11 5 It stated that the investors' income must
derive primarily from the sale of securities rather than from divi-
dends and interest."' In determining whether an investor qualifies
as a trader, the court identified several relevant factors. These in-
cluded the taxpayer's investment intent, the nature of the income
produced by the activity, and the "frequency, extent, and regularity"
of the securities transactions performed.' 17
The circuit court agreed with the lower court that the taxpayers
were investors, but rejected the active/passive distinction. " 8 Its argu-
ment was that the Higgins rule prevents the recognition of the inves-
tor as a trade or business if that investor is merely managing the
portfolio, regardless of the amount of time and effort applied to such
management or the size of the portfolio." 9 The opinion concluded
that the Mollers, merely by spending much time in managing their
large portfolio, were not carrying on a trade or business.12
3. Trade or Business Status For the Gambler
The issue of trade or business status has also been discussed in
a number of cases involving full-time gamblers. An examination of
this line of cases is appropriate here in light of the similarity in ac-
tivities between the full-time gambler and the full-time investor. In
fact, the activities of a full-time gambler have recently been treated
as those of a trade or business. In Commissioner v. Groetzinger,1 2' a
full-time gambler wished to declare a net gambling loss as a business
deduction. In order to resolve a conflict among the courts of ap-
113. Id. (citing Kales v. Commissioner, 101 F.2d 35, 38 (6th Cir. 1939)). See also Foss
v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 326, 327 (1st Cir. 1935); Washburn v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 949,
953 (8th Cir. 1931).
114. Moller, 553 F. Supp. at 1075.
115. See supra text accompanying note 68.
116. Moiler v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 814.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
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peal, 2 ' the Court granted certiorari. 2 After a lengthy review of the
cases within the investor/trader area, the Supreme Court, once and
for all, rejected the goods or services test as an absolute requirement
of trade or business qualification. 2 4 In the absence of the goods or
services test, the taxpayer in Groetzinger was able to satisfy the Su-
preme Court that he was indeed conducting a trade or business.1 5
The Groetzinger Court did not rely on, let alone inquire into,
the number of bets placed, nor on any other quantitative tests em-
ployed by the courts in the investor/trader cases. Instead, the Court
focused on qualitative factors such as the "full-time" nature of the
taxpayer's activity, his intent to make gambling a "livelihood
source," and a sense of "fairness:"
If a taxpayer, as Groetzinger is stipulated to have done in 1978,
devotes his full-time activity to gambling, and it is his intended
livelihood source, it would seem that basic concepts of fairness
(if there be much of that in the income tax law) demand that
his activity be regarded as a trade or business just as any other
readily accepted activity, such as . . . being . . . an active
trader on the exchanges. 1
26
This background has attempted to point out the inconsistencies
resulting both from the lack of an authoritative definition of trade or
business and from the almost random application of several tests for
determining trade or business on the basis of underlying facts and
circumstances. Also, it should be apparent that a different standard
has emerged to determine the trade or business status of a gambler:
one that doesn't measure frequency, but that emphasizes the qualita-
tive factors of the taxpayer. This comment does not seek to abandon
the facts and circumstances test as laid down by the Higgins Court.
Certainly, the courts must approach each case individually. Instead,
this comment will show that the current melee of tests and factors
should be assimilated into a more predictable standard. The follow-
ing analysis will point out why.
III. ANALYSIS
The spectrum of involvement in securities markets ranges from
122. Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
818 (1984).
123. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 26.
124. "[W]hile the offering of goods and services usually would qualify the activity as a
trade or business, this factor, it seems to us, is not an absolute prerequisite." Id. at 34.
125. Id. at 35-36.
126. Id. at 33.
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mere personal investment to the currently recognized trade or busi-
ness activity of the trader. Along this spectrum lies the part-time,
purely personal investor; the full-time, yet passive, investor; the full-
time and active investor; and the trader. The courts, at least by their
language, have drawn the trade or business boundary to include only
the trader. 11 7 The distinction is faulty for three reasons.
First, by removing the goods or services test as a trade or busi-
ness requirement, the Groetzinger decision leaves an inconsistent
comparison between the active investor and the gambler. Second,
under the auspices of the broadly defined "facts and circumstances"
test laid down in Higgins, the courts have set vague and arbitrary
"tests." The resulting uncertainty threatens to result in an overabun-
dance of litigation in predicting the amount and type of behavior that
will be accepted as that of a trade or business. Finally, these discrim-
inately selected factors only measure a limited range of the tax-
payer's activities, rather than an aggregate of the business activities
performed.
A. Groetzinger Removes Goods or Services Test
Commentators disagree as to which test the investor/trader dis-
tinction hinges on. This issue requires a return to the Higgins
case.' 28 Through an examination of that case, two theories emerge
regarding which test forms the basis for the distinction: (1) the inves-
tor/trader distinction hinges on the actively engaged test, or (2) the
investor/trader distinction hinges on the goods or service test. Did
the Higgins Court base its denial of trade or business on Mr. Hig-
gins' failure to engage in the activity actively, or was the denial
based on his failure to provide goods or services? If the Higgins
Court based its distinction on the actively engaged test, then the sub-
sequent removal of the goods or services requirement in Groetzinger
should have no effect on the investor/trader distinction. The distinc-
tion will survive on the authority of the actively engaged test. If, on
the other hand, the Court relied on the goods or services test and
127. See Snyder v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 134, 139 (1935) (the taxpayer could not be
"characterized as a 'trader on an exchange who makes a living in buying and selling securi-
ties' ") (citing Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1929)). See also text accom-
panying note 68 for the discussion in the Liang case comparing an investment account and a
trading account on the basis of the frequency of trading and the short-term tests.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 47-59. The Higgins case is important because
it provides the only Supreme Court authority on point with which the Groetzinger case can be
compared. If the rejection of the goods or services test in Groetzinger has any significance to
the investor, it is with respect to the origins of the investor line of cases. Higgins is the most
authoritative origin of this line.
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held that Mr. Higgins' failure to hold himself out to others as offer-
ing goods or services was controlling, then the removal of that test in
the Groetzinger case has the effect of destroying the distinction.
The first theory, that the investor/trader distinction is based on
the actively engaged test, maintains that the distinction could not log-
ically be based on the goods or services test because neither the
trader nor the investor are actually providing goods or services. Such
an argument would point out that even the trader
has no control of the price of his "product" nor how it is mar-
keted. He does not provide any services with regard to the sale
of his "product", does not advertise, does not have clients or
customers, and does not otherwise act as a middleman in reduc-
ing costs of exchange. In other words, a trader of stock and se-
curities is merely a market participant and does not "add to" his
"product" as would a businessman."'
In addition, proponents of this theory would argue that the Higgins
Court did not refer at all to the goods or services test. Rather, they
would point to the Supreme Court's statement that it was upholding
the lower court's finding that Higgins was not actively engaged. " "
Thus, the theory bases the investor/trader distinction on the failure
of the taxpayer's level of activity to rise to some quantifiable level of
activity.
It seems, however, that the Higgins opinion focused on the
character or quality of the taxpayer's activity rather than the quan-
tity of his activity. This theory is stronger than the first for two rea-
sons. First, both the trader and investor are actually providing goods.
They sell personal property in the form of securities to other buyers.
The buyer is a customer in the normal sense of the word and is
purchasing a "product" in the ordinary course of business. Also, it is
difficult to conclude that someone who spends forty hours per week
at a particular task, whatever that task may be, is not actively en-
gaged in it." ' Second, the opinion itself was careful to rely on the
fact that Mr. Higgins' activity consisted of the mere collection of
129. Orbach & White, supra note 15, at 41.
130. Contra Boiling & Carper, supra note 14, at 77, 80 (suggesting that the Higgins
Court, while appearing to apply the actively engaged test, actually may have been applying the
goods or services test, "disguised" as the actively engaged test).
131. See Boiling & Carper, supra note 14, at 80 (it is "difficult to conclude that a
person who manages and makes decisions on his own investment portfolio, spends as much as




income and the maintenance of records." 2 In fact, the very holding
of the opinion states that despite the level of activity, this type of
activity does not meet the trade or business requirement. " ' So,
whether or not the taxpayer is actively .engaged, if he or she is
merely collecting income and maintaining records, trade or business
status will be denied. Thus, the controlling test in Higgins appears
to be the goods or services test.'3
Since the Groetzinger holding removes the goods or services test
as an absolute requirement for obtaining trade or business status, the
only factors remaining as absolute requirements are the actively en-
gaged test and the profit motive test. Furthermore, if the goods or
services test is actually "disguised" as the actively engaged test in the
investor context, then once the first is no longer required, neither is
the second.'88 From this logic, it follows that any activity performed
with only the remaining factual requirement, profit motive, is a
trade or business.' Congress may have actually used this reasoning
when it formulated the predecessor to IRC section 212, which allows
a deduction for the production or collection of income, " because it
passed this deduction only two years after the Higgins Court stated
that trade or business status would not apply to one who "merely
• . . collected interest and dividends from his securities." 38
Although this line of reasoning may seem absurd, it points out
the inconsistencies left by the Groetzinger decision. Of these incon-
sistencies, the most important was the Supreme Court's failure to
recognize the similarities between the full-time, active investor and
the full-time gambler. The similarities are strong and yet the Court
132. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941) ("The petitioner merely kept
records and collected interest and dividends from his securities, through managerial attention
for his investments.").
133. Id. ("No matter how large the estate or how continuous or extended the work
required may be, such facts are not sufficient as a matter of law to permit the courts to reverse
the decision of the Board.").
134. One author suggests that the Higgins Court may have "disguised" the goods or
services test as the actively engaged test. Boiling & Carper, supra note 14, at 77 ("Perhaps the
Higgins court was not really applying the 'actively engaged' test, but was really saying that
security investors do not hold themselves out to the public as selling either goods or services.").
135. Boiling & Carper, supra note 14, at 80. In other words, if the Higgins court actu-
ally "disguised" the goods or services test as the actively engaged test, then when the goods or
services test is eliminated, as it was in Groetzinger, the actively engaged test is also no longer
an absolute requirement. Boiling & Carper, supra note 14, at 80.
136. Boiling & Carper, supra note 14, at 80.
137. 26 U.S.C. § 212 (1987).
138. 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941). See also Boiling & Carper, supra note 14, at 80. ("Re-
call Congress's indignation and surprise over the 1941 Higgins decision and the speed with
which it took corrective action by enacting the predecessor of section 212.").
1989]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
left untouched the active investor's fate while granting trade or busi-
ness status to the gambler. For both, the return on a particular in-
vestment depends almost exclusively on circumstances outside their
control. The active investor's stock sales and purchases resemble the
bets of the gambler. The active investor's research and investigation
of companies actually and potentially within his portfolio are quite
similar to the gambler's investigation of the horses upon which he
will place bets. Just as the active investor will diversify his portfolio
to avoid risk, so too will the gambler avoid putting "all his eggs in
one basket." Finally, the stock certificate represents the active inves-
tor's gamble that the value will go up in value, while the gambler's
betting slip indicates his gamble that his horse will win. " 9
B. Judicial Reliance on Certain Vague and Arbitrary Factors
Within the Facts and Circumstances Test
The advantages and disadvantages of establishing trade or busi-
ness status have been explored. 40 As such, the consequences of re-
form in this area might affect the taxpayer negatively, as well as
positively. Thus, improvement of the investor's individual tax status
is not the sole impetus for reform. The need for reform is also evi-
denced by the amount of unnecessary litigation and uncertainty that
has followed the reliance on vague and arbitrary factors in determin-
ing trade or business status.
The source of this uncertainty can be traced back to the Higgins
case. The Higgins Court offered no assistance to future investors or
their attorneys in determining the quantity or quality of activity re-
quired to earn trade or business recognition. While the result to the
particular taxpayer in Higgins may have been appropriate, courts in
subsequent cases could only use the decision for the proposition that
facts similar to those presented in Higgins would not qualify a tax-
payer as a trade or business. When faced with a different set of facts,
a court could not derive a proper standard from Higgins, other than
the facts and circumstances test and the three traditional tests. As a
result, the development of the law in this area proceeded awkwardly
and without the direction of an authoritative standard.
The Groetzinger case also failed to resolve the difficulties re-
139. Orbach & White, supra note 15, at 41 (comparing the trader and the gambler).
This comment asserts that the similarities between the trader and the full-time gambler are as
compelling as those between the full-time, active investor and the full-time gambler.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 2-8. Because of both the advantages and disad-
vantages of trade or business status, one commentator has called for a neutral definition, one
which favors neither the government nor the taxpayer. Olson, supra note 9, at 1235.
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suiting from the Higgins progeny. By leaving the investor line of
cases unresolved, 41 the court missed a unique opportunity to at least
show a willingness to apply its holding equally to both the investor
and the gambler. Instead, the investor is left with a set of vaguely
stated factors while the gambler knows with certainty what must be
done to qualify for trade or business status.14
Cases subsequent to Higgins continued the trend of relying on
vague factors. One such vague factor is the taxpayer's duration of
holding as emphasized in the Liang case. 4 The Liang test requires
that all securities held or sold by a taxpayer be judged by the
amount of time they are held by the taxpayer prior to sale."" Cer-
tainly on an intuitive level, a security held for less than a week can
be termed a short-term holding and one held for five years, a long-
term holding. But what of those held for a month, three months, six
months, a year, or more? What length of time should qualify as
long-term? It is conceivable that one court would draw the line at
one month while another would do so at one year. The uncertainty
resulting from this and other factors examined in the context of a
facts and circumstances test is not only a burden on the investor, but
a burden on the judiciary, for uncertainty breeds dispute and dispute
breeds litigation. An emphasis on an uncertain facts and circum-
stances test invites litigation, threatens to result in inconsistent judi-
cial rulings, and is, in the words of one circuit court, the reliance on
a "non-test."" 5
In addition to being vague, the short-term test also has a ques-
tionable origin. The Liang court injected the often-cited paragraph
141. Justice Blackmun's opinion explicitly left untouched the holding in Higgins.
Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). While not expressed in the opinion, the
implication is that the holding in Groetzinger should receive limited application to the facts
involving the full-time gambler. Such an implication would leave the line of investor cases still
to cope with Frankfurter's goods or services "gloss." Id. at 31, 32. But this result would be
inconsistent with the Groetzinger rejection of the Frankfurter gloss, which has its roots in the
investment case of DuPont.
142. If the gambler can prove that his activity is performed full-time, in good faith, with
regularity, for the production of income, for his livelihood, and not as a mere hobby, he is
presumed to be conducting a trade or business. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 35-36. The investor,
on the other hand, must rely on the "facts and circumstances" test at the least, and the uncer-
tainty of the frequency of trading and the short-term tests at the most.
143. See supra text accompanying note 68. Because the taxpayer's holdings must be
short-term in duration according to Liang, the test will be referred to as the short-term test.
144. Chang Hsiao Liang v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 1040, 1044 (1955) (stating its rule
that "[t]he absence of frequent short-term turnover ...negatives the conclusion that these
securities were sold as part of a trading operation rather than as investment activity").
145. Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 818 (1984).
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into its opinion as a definitional statement. 46 The paragraph distin-
guishes between the investment account and the trader account on
the basis of long-term/short-term differences. Later in the opinion,
the court uses this definition as its basis for recognizing trade or bus-
iness in the trading operation and not in the investment operation.
But the opinion makes the proposition without reference, by citation,
to another case. 1 7 This proposition was merely invented by the
court. As easily as the Liang court distinguished the investor based
on the duration of his holdings, subsequent courts cited Liang for the
proposition that the taxpayer must direct his or her activity toward
short-term rather than long-term trading. 4 Such development of the
law by fiat is the natural result in an area where no workable stan-
dard exists and where the courts are left only with referral to a facts
and circumstances test.
Uncertainty is also the product of another vague factor empha-
sized by the Liang court: the frequency of trading. The court's em-
phasis on this factor also led to its development as an absolute re-
quirement, rather than its maintenance as one of many "facts and
circumstances." This test suggests that the number of trades made by
the investor shall be determinative of trade or business status. How-
ever, it is difficult to extract a precise numerical guide from the cases
using this test. In the Moiler' 9 case, the appellate court held that
the taxpayers were not performing a trade or business after examin-
ing the frequency with which they bought and sold securities. The
Mollers made 124 and 106 transactions in consecutive tax years.' 0
On the other hand, in Fuld' and Levin,' 52 where the courts
did confer trade or business status, the frequency of trading was
greater. Leonhard Fuld's total sales approximated 347 in the tax
year and Florentine's numbered 318 for the same period.' 8 Mr.
146. See supra text accompanying note 68.
147. Had this restriction been the intention of the Court, it would have articulated it as
a requirement when it established the facts and circumstances test in Higgins.
148. See Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing the tests
from Liang and concluding that "in order to be a trader, a taxpayer's activities must be di-
rected to short-term trading, not the long-term holding of investments"); Purvis v. Commis-
sioner, 530 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1976) (relying on the "frequency, extent, and regular-
ity" of taxpayer's transactions "as well as his intent to derive profit from relatively short-term
turnovers").
149. See supra text accompanying notes 95-120.
150. In 1976, the taxpayers made eighty-three purchases of securities and forty-one
sales. In 1977, they made seventy-six purchases and thirty sales. Moller, 721 F.2d at 811.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 71-80.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 81-94.
153. In 1933, Leonhard made "approximately two hundred and forty-nine sales of se-
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Levin conducted 332 transactions during the tax year.154
Although the gap between the two sets of numbers seems large,
these numbers produce no guideline upon which future investors can
base their activities with any predictability. The investor making 200
transactions per year, for instance, is unable to determine from these
cases whether he is conducting a trade or business. The Federal Cir-
cuit attempted to standardize the requisite frequency when it noted
that, in those cases where trade or business status was conferred, the
taxpayers "were engaged in market transactions on an almost daily
basis."" Considering there are fifty work weeks per year and the
securities markets are open a maximum of five days per week, the
number of possible trading days per year is no more than 250. Mr.
Levin and the Fulds surpassed this number, while the Mollers did
not.
But, the Moller court suggested that "almost" daily trading was
sufficient. " Wouldn't the Mollers' 124 transactions, presumably
made once every two days, qualify? In fact, it is possible for one
investor to make fewer trades than another during the year, yet trade
on a more frequent, "almost daily," basis. If the second investor
lumps all of his or her trades together on only a few days throughout
the year, he may have made enough transactions to qualify, but did
not trade on an "almost daily" basis. As can be seen, even a determi-
nation based on "almost daily" trading leads to no more certainty
than one based merely on a general concept of frequent trading. It is
this uncertainty, when combined with the resulting unnecessary liti-
gation, that suggests an immediate need for a carefully crafted and
predictable standard to define the parameters of trade or business for
the investor.
C. Factors Examine Limited Scope of Taxpayer's Activity
The duration of holding and frequency of trading factors de-
scribed above also exemplify the limited scope with which the courts
examine the "facts and circumstances" of a particular case. Neither
curities held for more than two years and approximately ninety-eight held for two years or
less." Fuld v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 465, 467 (2d Cir. 1943). Florentine made "approxi-
mately two hundred twenty nine sales of securities held for more than two years and approxi-
mately eighty-nine held for two years or less." Id.
154. In 1961, Mr. Levin's 332 transactions included 112,400 shares and were valued at
a total of $3,452,125. Levin v. United States, 597 F.2d 760, 763 (Ct. CI. 1979).
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factor suggests more than the time spent merely buying and selling
securities. Actual trades represent a mere fraction of the investor's
time spent earning a livelihood. The full-time, active investor devotes
a great deal of business time to other activities not measured by the
court. Other activities include the research of and contact with com-
panies with which the investor is financially involved; contact with
the market and collection of information from it, either through a
broker or by other means;157 attendance at seminars; and delibera-
tion and decision-making. The cases making the investor/trader dis-
tinction do so not on the basis of the taxpayer's total business activ-
ity, but on the basis of only one segment of his or her activities.
An example from outside the investor/trader context helps ex-
plain the inequities of the distinction. The owner and operator of a
small shoe store is in the business of selling shoes to the public. Be-
cause of fluctuations in demand, the owner's inventory rises and
falls. Some styles do not sell as well as others and must be held for
longer periods of time. Simply because some of his shoes might have
been held for a long period of time does not justify the IRS in deny-
ing trade or business status to the shoe store owner. Likewise, if the
economy in the community collapses and the frequency with which
the owner trades his shoes drops to a very low level, his trade or
business status is not removed. The owner is still said to be con-
ducting a business because he is maintaining his store, keeping
records, and performing other activities that suggest he is still in bus-
iness. This hypothetical points out that in most business situations it
is the entirety of the taxpayer's activity which is suggestive of
whether or not he or she is participating in a trade or business, not
just a glimpse at one or two factors.
The courts limit the scope of their examination to quantitative
factors to the exclusion of important qualitative factors. 58 For in-
stance, the frequency of the investor's trading is a measure of the
number of securities exchanged. Frequency weighs the taxpayer's
level of activity without consideration of the nature or character of
the activity. Reliance on the level of activity alone, however, is not an
effective measure of an entity's business character." 9 In the cases
157. Charles Schwab & Co. offers a software package that provides direct, on-line trad-
ing, price quotations, stock market news and company profile reports. CHARLES SCHWAB &
Co., THE EQUALIZER: FAST NEWS, TODAY'S RESEARCH, INSTANT TRADING (1987).
158. Boyle, supra note 16, at 759-62.
159. Boyle, supra note 16, at 759. Comparing the activities of many categories of tax-
payers, it is "readily apparent that the level of activity is not an effective test." Boyle, supra
note 16, at 759. Some taxpayers who have been classified as conducting a trade or business
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following Liang, the courts gave brief discussions of the number of
transactions made and the length of time the securities were held
prior to sale. However, in none of these cases did the courts discuss
qualitative characteristics of a trade or business such as the tax-
payer's level of skill, the extent to which the business is his occupa-
tion, the reliance on that business for his livelihood, and the proprie-
tary interest in the business.' 0  These factors are equally
determinative of a trade or business, yet they go unrecognized by the
courts. Moreover, an emphasis on qualitative factors would result in
more equitable and consistent decisions.16"
The reluctance of the courts in examining these factors, at least
in the investor/trader context, might be their preconceived, subjective
notion that the investor is not conducting a legitimate business. Be-
cause the investor does not participate in a classic employer/em-
ployee relationship, but rather devotes his full energies to an activity
at which most other taxpayers spend very little time, the quality of
activity is judged somehow to be less valuable.
The Groetzinger decision leaves open the possibility that the in-
vestor may qualify as a trade or business.1 " The uncertainty left
both by the reliance in Moller on certain vague and arbitrary factors
and by the Groetzinger Court's failure to take advantage of the op-
portunity to establish a standard for the investor, signals the need for
reform. Unless a new and clearly understood standard is adopted,
the issues will continue to be litigated. This comment proposes that a
spend little or no time at their respective jobs. Others, including some who are not considered
as carrying on a trade or business, spend significant amounts of time at their enterprises.
Boyle, supra note 16, at 759.
160. Some of the qualitative characteristics of trade or business activity can be summed
up in a test that measures the "degree of personal effort and skill." Boyle, supra note 16, at
759, 762. When the real estate dealer is analyzed under this test, it is apparent that he "takes
a piece of property and works with it to make money. The land itself does not appreciate in
value on its own. It is the efforts of the dealer that make the property more valuable." Boyle,
supra note 16, at 760.
161. The Boyle article points out that a
[cIlose examination by courts of what the taxpayer is doing is likely to reveal
whether the taxpayer is managing and preserving his investments or whether he
is pursuing a trade or business. No distinction should be based on the type of
investment asset. For example, the distinction between real estate and securities
investors should be eliminated.
Boyle, supra note 16, at 766.
See generally Schwartz v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 733 (1955) (treating even a single par-
cel of improved real estate as constituting a trade or business).
162. Curtis, supra note 16, at 233. Additionally, the Groetzinger decision will en-
courage undesirable litigation by full-time, active investors who seek to avoid the disadvantages
of failing to meet the trade or business test. Curtis, supra note 16, at 233, 234.
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standard encompassing qualitative as well as quantitative factors be
adopted.
IV. PROPOSAL
In light of the foregoing analysis, the need for a more enlighten-
ing standard of categorizing trade or business activity is apparent. In
order to provide guidance to the taxpayer, reduce the burden of un-
necessary litigation, remove inconsistencies in application, and deter-
mine trade or business status with equity, the standard should be
formulated to include the full-time, active investor as a trade or busi-
ness. This will require inching the barrier to trade or business status
closer to the investor. The new boundary will include the trader and
the full-time, active investor as trade or business entities, and exclude
the passive investor.
What is less obvious, however, is who should take the responsi-
bility for reformulating a standard. On the one hand, the Supreme
Court has recently placed Congress on official notice that it will de-
fer to that body the "ultimate responsibility" for "repair or revi-
sion."16 The Court reasoned that the difficulty with a judicially im-
posed solution to the problems inherent in a facts and circumstances
test is twofold: (1) the term "trade or business" has wide utilization
in the Code despite the lack of an all-purpose definition by statute or
regulation and (2) an attempt to devise and apply a test for all situa-
tions by judicial means would be "counterproductive, unhelpful, and
even somewhat precarious for the overall integrity of the Code.""'
Despite these warnings, it is unlikely that Congress will act
swiftly in giving statutory meaning to the phrase trade or busi-
ness.' 65 As long as the debate over the investor's status has contin-
ued, Congress has been content to allow the debate to rage in the
courts. Except for the section 212 deduction in response to Higgins,
Congress has acquiesced to the decisions of the courts without any
effort on its part to clarify the statutory meaning of trade or busi-
ness. By acquiescing, Congress has deferred to the courts for any
clarification. Therefore, a judicial remedy is required."'
The new standard must begin by recognizing the presence and
effect of the facts and circumstances test and by enumerating the fac-
163. Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 36 (1987).
164. Id.
165. Olson, supra note 9, at 1202. Even where the courts disagree, Congress has been
reluctant to redefine common law tax principals. Congress will probably continue to use the
phrase "trade or business" without formulating a definition. Olson, supra note 9, at 1202.
166. Olson, supra note 9, at 1202-03.
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tors under the test that courts should place primary and almost ex-
clusive reliance upon. Without the enumeration, a facts and circum-
stances test can only produce a minimal amount of certainty. Thus,
the new scheme will take the form of an enumeration of several fac-
tors or tests the courts should emphasize in making their
determination.
Of course, the goods or services test will not be a requirement
within the new standard since the Groetzinger Court rejected it and
recognized that almost every activity would satisfy its "gloss." 16
The new approach should consist of four separate tests. In or-
der to qualify for trade or business status, each test must be satisfied.
First, the standard must recognize the continuing importance of both
the profit motive and the actively engaged tests. The profit motive
test is important because it eliminates any enterprises entered into in
bad faith or without the desire to earn profit, the primary congres-
sional objective in enacting the trade or business deduction. The ac-
tively engaged test ensures that the taxpayer is not performing the
activity on such a low level as to minimize its significance.
In addition to the profit motive and actively engaged tests, the
new standard must also include tests that measure the qualitative
characteristics of conducting trade or business activity. A test that
examines the taxpayer's intent to conduct the activity as an occupa-
tion would be such a test.168 An occupational test would be useful
because it would not restrict any previously recognized trade or busi-
ness activities, yet it would broaden the classification just enough to
include those taxpayers who have chosen to spend their time pursu-
ing what might generally be referred to as their calling, skill, trade,
or vocation. Clearly, the full-time, active investor who makes an oc-
cupation of investing would, under this test, be considered a trade or
business.
Finally, the standard should include a fourth test that prevents
the trade or business recognition of activities that are mere personal
or recreational activities. This test would require that the taxpayer
rely or depend on the activity for his or her livelihood. 69 If the activ-
167. 480 U.S. at 31, 32.
168. This occupation test is similar to the "personal effort and skill" test as espoused in
Boyle, supra note 16, at 759, 762. Both tests seek to measure the qualitative, rather than
quantitative, characteristics of the taxpayer in determining whether he is conducting a trade or
business.
169. Frazer & Brady, Does Recent Decision Defining Trade or Business Extend Be-
yond the Full-time Gambler?, TAX'N FOR Accr., July 1987, at 6, 7. See also Groetzinger, 480
U.S. at 33 (conditioning the gambler's trade or business status on his "intended livelihood
source").
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ity is used to provide some form of support for the taxpayer's liveli-
hood, such activity ought to be considered a trade or business if the
other tests are satisfied. The livelihood test is important in that it
excludes collateral activities, but it is not inconsistent with the recog-
nition in the case law that a taxpayer can be engaged in more than
one trade or business. 170 This test would simply require that all of
the taxpayer's trade or businesses contribute to his or her livelihood.
To summarize, the proposed standard should be composed of
the following four tests:
1. Is the activity performed with a profit motive?
2. Is the taxpayer actively engaged in the particular activity?
3. Can the activity be considered the taxpayer's occupation?
4. Is the taxpayer dependent on the activity for his or her
livelihood?
V. CONCLUSION
The current state of the law in the area of investment taxation
is far from orderly. Much of the clutter is left behind by the Higgins
decision and its progeny. 17' The Higgins Court attempted to estab-
lish that investment activity of the type Mr. Higgins was conducting
would not be considered a trade or business.' 72 It left unresolved
whether other types of activity might be considered trade or business
activity. The cases following Higgins rewrote its proposition as if the
Court meant that all types of investment activity fall short of trade
or business recognition. 173 In retrospect, the Court established the
groundwork for a distinction between a passive and active investor
that virtually all courts have failed to employ.
Reform is now necessary in order to prevent further uncertainty
and to benefit the full-time, active investor whose activity clearly
ought to fall within the category of trade or business. The facts and
circumstances test is the framework within which trade or business
determinations are made. The courts have used it in different con-
170. Estate of Cull v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1007 (1985).
171. In particular, the Moller decision leaves a troubling result. The extensive level of
activity exhibited there should at first glance satisfy those who would require a high quantita-
tive level of activity. But the court in Moller implied that it was the wrong "type" of activity
that was being performed at such a high level. From this result, it is difficult for the investor to
conclude whether his activity is the right "type."
172. For a discussion of the passive standard established in Higgins, see supra note 56.
173. Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 202 (1963) (in holding that a taxpayer's
involvement, service and investment in a single corporation is not conducting a trade or busi-
ness, the Court emphatically stated that "investing is not a trade or business").
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texts to mean different things. It has led to judicial picking and
choosing as to which facts and which circumstances should be ex-
amined. A refocusing of the facts and circumstances test with an em-
phasis on qualitative factors will help to standardize the meaning of
trade or business for the investor. A redefined concept of trade or
business will rid this area of further uncertainty, deter unnecessary
litigation and afford the full-time, active investor the benefits and
drawbacks due every other similarly situated trade or business.
James H. Blundell, Jr.

